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Introduction
All medical subspecialties have been
subject to increased scrutiny about the
ways by which their financial associations
with industry, such as pharmaceutical
companies, may influence, or give the
appearance of influencing, recommenda-
tions in review articles [1] and clinical
practice guidelines [2]. Psychiatry has
been at the epicenter of these concerns,
in part because of high-profile cases
involving ghostwriting [3,4] and failure
to report industry-related income [5], and
studies highlighting conflicts of interest in
promoting psychotropic drugs [6,7]. The
revised Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM), scheduled for
publication in May 2013 by the American
Psychiatric Association (APA), has created
a firestorm of controversy because of
questions about undue industry influence.
Some have questioned whether the inclu-
sion of new disorders (e.g., Attenuated
Psychotic Risk Syndrome) and widening of
the boundaries of current disorders (e.g.,
Adjustment Disorder Related to Bereave-
ment) reflects corporate interests [8,9].
These concerns have been raised because
the nomenclature, criteria, and standard-
ization of psychiatric disorders codified in
the DSM have a large public impact in a
diverse set of areas ranging from insu-
rance claims to jurisprudence. Moreover,
through its relationship to the Internation-
al Classification of Diseases [10], the
system used for classification by many
countries around the world, the DSM has a
global reach.
After receiving criticism that DSM-IV
had no financial disclosure of panel
members, to its credit the APA instituted
a mandatory disclosure policy [11]. The
DSM-5 panel members are required to file
financial disclosure statements, which are
expected to be listed in the publication,
and the APA has made a commitment to
improve its management of financial
conflicts of interest (FCOIs).
This new APA requirement makes the
DSM’s disclosure policy more congruent
with most leading medical journals and
federal policies on FCOI. FCOIs are
widely recognized as problematic because
of the data showing a clear connection
between funding source and study out-
come whereby results are favorably biased
toward the interests of the funder [12–
14]—what has been referred to as the
‘‘funding effect’’ [15]. Some have argued
that greater transparency of financial
interests may facilitate a decline in FCOIs
and a decrease in the potential bias that
accompanies them, and that it may
encourage professionals and consumers
to more critically evaluate medical infor-
mation [16]. Others are not sure that
disclosure will reduce FCOIs and the
potential for bias, because transparency
alone just ‘‘shifts the problem from one of
‘secrecy of bias’ to ‘openness of bias’’’ [15].
Additionally, there is the concern that
disclosure may open the door for subter-
fuge [17]. That is, when researchers or
panel members list every affiliation that
they have ever had, including funding
from federal agencies, it can create a
‘‘signal-to-noise problem,’’ thereby ob-
scuring the truth about deeply problematic
financial relationships with industry.
We have reported elsewhere on industry
relationships with DSM-5 task force mem-
bers [18]. Although the composition of the
task force has changed slightly since its
formation in 2007 (e.g., Pilecki et al. [19]
found 72% of the members had ties in
early 2011) industry relationships persist
despite increased transparency. Currently,
69% of the DSM-5 task force members
report having ties to the pharmaceutical
industry. This represents a relative in-
crease of 21% over the proportion of
DSM-IV task force members with such ties
(57% of DSM-IV task force members had
ties). This finding is congruent with
emerging data from fields outside of
psychiatry suggesting that transparency of
funding source alone is an insufficient
solution for eliminating bias [20–23].
In 2006 we analyzed all DSM-IV panel
members’ financial associations with in-
dustry [24]. We have undertaken a similar
analysis for DSM-5 panels, which allowed
us to compare the proportions of DSM-IV
and -5 panel members who have industry
ties. There are 141 panel members on the
13 DSM-5 panels and 29 task force
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are responsible for revisions to diagnostic
categories and for inclusion of new
disorders within a diagnostic category.
Three-fourths of the work groups
(Figure 1; [2,4–6,8,10–12]) continue to
have a majority of their members with
financial ties to the pharmaceutical indus-
try. It is also noteworthy that, as with the
DSM-IV, the most conflicted panels are
those for which pharmacological treatment
is the first-line intervention. For example,
67% (N=12) of the panel for Mood
Disorders, 83% (N=12) of the panel for
Psychotic Disorders, and 100% (N=7) of
the Sleep/Wake Disorders (which now
includes ‘‘Restless Leg Syndrome’’) have
ties to the pharmaceutical companies that
manufacture the medications used to treat
these disorders or to companies that service
the pharmaceutical industry.
Gaps in APA’s Disclosure Policy
Although the APA has made the disclo-
sure of FCOIs of DSM panel members
more transparent, there are important gaps
in the current policy that need to be
addressed:
1. The current APA disclosure policy does
not require panel members to specifical-
ly identify speakers’ bureau membership
but rather cloaks it under ‘‘honoraria.’’
(A speakers’ bureau usually refers to an
arrangement between a commercial
entity or its agent whereby an individual
is hired to give a presentation about the
company’s product. The company typ-
ically has the contractual right to create
and/or control the content of the
presentation.) Therefore, despite in-
creased transparency, it remains unclear
how many individuals participate on
speakers bureaus, because panel mem-
bers may simply list ‘‘honoraria.’’ None
of the DSM panel members identified
participation on a speakers bureau.
When we did an internet search of the
141 panel members, we found that 15%
had disclosed elsewhere that they were
members of drug companies’ speakers
bureaus or advisory boards. These
Summary Points
N The American Psychiatric Association (APA) instituted a financial conflict of
interest disclosure policy for the 5th edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).
N The new disclosure policy has not been accompanied by a reduction in the
financial conflicts of interest of DSM panel members.
N Transparency alone cannot mitigate the potential for bias and is an insufficient
solution for protecting the integrity of the revision process.
N Gaps in APA’s disclosure policy are identified and recommendations for more
stringent safeguards are offered.
Figure 1. Comparison of financial conflicts of interest among DSM-IV and DSM-5 task force and work group members.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001190.g001
PLoS Medicine | www.plosmedicine.org 2 March 2012 | Volume 9 | Issue 3 | e1001190internet searches were conducted for
sources published in the years 2006 (1
year beforethetaskforce wasappointed)
to 2011, a time period congruent with
published research on financial conflicts
of interest. Searches included peer-
reviewed articles, conferences, participa-
tion in continuing medical education
events (i.e., courses and/or seminars for
health professionals) and self-reporting
of any industry ties following interviews
with the media. Speakers bureau and
advisory board participation were in-
cluded in our analysis only when there
was unambiguous information (e.g.,
‘‘Dr. Smith discloses that he serves on
the speakers bureau for Eli Lilly and
Pfizer’’) and both authors (LC, SK) were
in agreement. The nature of these
relationships needs to be spelled out
more precisely; speakers bureau partic-
ipation is usually prohibited elsewhere
(e.g., for faculty in medical schools), as it
is widely recognized to constitute a
significant FCOI. Pharmaceutical com-
panies refer to individuals who serve on
speakers bureaus as ‘‘key opinion lead-
ers’’ (KOLs) because they are seen as
essential to the marketing of diseases as
well as drugs.
2. Exclusions to the APA DSM-5 disclo-
sure policy include unrestricted re-
search grants [11]; that is, panel
members are not required to disclose
unrestricted research grants from in-
dustry. However, we would argue that
this exclusion allows for commercial
interests to be reflected in the revision
process: there is no evidence to suggest
that simply because money comes in
the form of a large ‘‘unrestricted’’
research grant it does not create an
obligation to reciprocate or invoke an
implicit bias.
3. The current policy places high and
arbitrary threshold limits on monies
allowed from industry: DSM panel
members are allowed to receive
US$10,000 per year from industry
(e.g., for consultancies), and panel
members are allowed to have up to
US$50,000 in stock holdings in phar-
maceutical companies.
4. In contrast to other disclosure policies
(e.g., the Physician Payments Sunshine
Act of 2007 and the 2011 US National
Institutes of Health policy on conflicts
of interest), APA’s policy does not
require disclosure of the amount of
money received from industry.
However, transparency alone cannot
mitigate bias. Because industry relation-
ships can create a ‘‘pro-industry habit of
thought’’ [25], having financial ties to
industry such as honoraria, consultation,
or grant funding is as pernicious a problem
as speaker’s bureau participation. Over
four decades of research from social
psychology clearly demonstrates that
gifts—even small ones—create obligations
to reciprocate [26–28]. Also, because of
the enormous influences of diagnostic and
treatment guidelines, the standards for
participation on a guideline development
panel should be higher than those set for
an average faculty member [29,30].
Conclusion
The DSM-5 will be published in about
14 months, enough time for the APA to
institute important changes that would
allow the organization to achieve its stated
goal of a ‘‘… transparent process of
development for the DSM, and …an
unbiased, evidence-based DSM, free
from any conflicts of interest’’ [em-
phasis added] [31]. Toward that goal we
believe it is essential that:
1. As an eventual gold standard and
because of their actual and perceived
influence, all DSM task force members
should be free of FCOIs.
2. Individuals who have participated on
pharmaceutical companies’ Speakers
Bureaus should be prohibited from
DSM panel membership.
3. There should be a rebuttable presump-
tion of prohibiting FCOIs among the
DSM work groups. When no indepen-
dent individuals with the requisite
expertise are available, individuals with
associations to industry could consult to
the DSM panels, but they would not
have decision-making authority on
revisions or inclusion of new disorders.
These changes would accommodate the
participation of needed experts as well as
provide more stringent safeguards to
protect the revision process from either
the reality of or the perception of undue
industry influence.
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